Health Matrix: The Journal of LawMedicine
Volume 31

Issue 1

Article 6

2021

Would we be Right to Try “Right to Try”?
José Miola
Bernadette J. Richards

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
José Miola and Bernadette J. Richards, Would we be Right to Try “Right to Try”?, 31 Health Matrix 107 ()
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol31/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of LawMedicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021

Would we be Right to Try
“Right to Try”?
José Miola & Bernadette J. Richards†
Abstract
In both the United Kingdom and United States of America
legislation has been proposed or enacted which claims to provide
patients with a ‘right’ of access to experimental drugs and treatments
where there is no other hope. In this paper we will explore this narrative
and consider the steps taken in the United States to shift to a more
rights driven legal framework. The paper will critically assess the
United States model and the similarly framed ‘Saatchi’ model in the
United Kingdom; demonstrating that, despite the rights-based
narrative, these laws do not represent a significant change in access to
treatment for patients. Rather, the reality is that this ‘right to try’
paradigm represents a patient advocate narrative that is deeply flawed.
It fails to implement any meaningful change, exposes vulnerable
patients to risk of harm and, potentially, delays safe development of
potentially life-saving treatment regimes.
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Introduction
The traditional doctor-patient relationship grew out of the
paternalistic Hippocratic tradition.1 It was an unequal interaction with
†

José Miola, Professor of Law and Chair in Law and Social Justice, School
of Law, University of Leeds, United Kingdom. Bernadette J. Richards,
Associate Professor of Law, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide,
Australia.

1.

See, e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Toward an Expanded Medical Ethics:
The Hippocratic Ethic Revisited, in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON
MEDICAL ETHICS 25 (Robert M. Veatch, ed., 1989); JOSÉ MIOLA, MEDICAL
ETHICS AND MEDICAL LAW: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP 23 (2007).
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the all-knowing doctor sharing their knowledge and expertise with lesseducated or uninformed patients.2 A patients’ best interests were
determined wholly by the doctor who was responsible for all clinical
decisions, and healthcare was something done to the vulnerable patient
who was a passive participant in the treatment process.3 Gradually over
time this traditional paradigm has shifted with the patient becoming
an active participant in the clinical relationship which is now most
commonly defined as a partnership.4 In some circumstances the
pendulum has continued to swing through the partnership model to a
rights-based narrative, with some asserting that the patient voice
should be stronger, that the existing regulatory control over access to
emerging treatment is inappropriate and that patients have a right to
access treatments that would otherwise be withheld from them.5 The
patients have now shifted from being passive recipients of treatment to
being characterized as “consumer exercising choice.”6 This exemplifies
our new, patient-facing medical law.
This rights-based dialogue has driven the development, and in the
United States successful introduction, of so-called ‘right to try’ laws.7
The narrative around these laws is that patients have a right to access
even unproven drugs and forms of treatment, and that the existing

2.

Pellegrino, supra note 1, at 27. See Richard L. Street et al., Beliefs About
Control in the Physician-patient Relationship, 18(8) J. GEN. INTERN
MED. 609 (2003).

3.

See MIOLA, supra note 1, at ch. 2.

4.

Such a model is evident in the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015]
UKSC 11, [81] (appeal taken from Scot.). See also Community Research,
Doctors’ Attitude to Consent and Shared Decision-Making: Full Research
Report for the GMC 11-13 (2017), https://www.gmc-uk.org/media/
documents/Doctors_attitudes_to_consent_and_shared_decision_
making_ FINAL_research_report.pdf_72137875.pdf.

5.

H. Fernandez Lynch et al., Promoting Patient Interests in Implementing
the Federal Right to Try Act, 320(9) JAMA 869 (2018).

6.

Indeed, this language of patients’ rights can be said to be the key message
of the decision in Montgomery. Montgomery UKSC 11, at [75]. See R.
HEYWOOD & J. MIOLA., The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical
Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the Matter, 133 LQR
296 (2017). But see Jonathan Montgomery, Law and the demoralization
of medicine, 26 (2) LEGAL STUDIES 185, 187-88 (2006), and Jonathan
Montgomery & Elsa Montgomery, Montgomery on informed consent: an
inexpert decision?, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 89, 90-91 (2016).

7.

For the federal version, see Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan
McLinn and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act 2017, S. 204, 115th Cong.
(2017). For a full, updated list of states’ laws see Right To Try In Your
State, GOLDWATER
INST., http://righttotry.org/in-your-state/
[https://perma.cc/2FPA-2D94].
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framework represents an unacceptable denial of hope.8 The focus of
these laws is therefore on restoring ‘patient rights’ and the assertion
that the State and regulatory bodies are withholding access, and
therefore hope, from desperate patients. This represents a significant
shift from a protectionist model whereby new medical treatments must
work through carefully constructed stages of testing to ensure that they
are safe to a demand and supply model (the patient can assert a right
to take risks that, in the previous, principled approach, the State
asserted were unacceptable.9 In this paper we will explore this narrative
and consider the steps taken in the United States to shift to a more
rights-driven legal framework. The paper will critically assess the
United States model and the similarly-framed ‘Saatchi’ model in the
United Kingdom; demonstrating that, despite the rights-based
narrative, these laws do not represent a significant change in access to
treatment for patients. Rather, the reality is that this ‘right to try’
paradigm represents a patient-advocate narrative that is deeply flawed.
It fails to implement any meaningful change, exposes vulnerable
patients to risk of harm and, potentially, delays safe development of
potentially life-saving treatment regimes. In short, the ‘right to try’
movement is inappropriately named and should instead be given the
far less catchy, but more accurate label: ‘right to ask to try an unproven
and potentially dangerous form of treatment.’

I.

What are ‘Right to Try’ Laws?

Right to try laws are a legislative trend that has swept through
America. Over 40 states have already passed such laws, with others
having introduced them into their state legislatures and going through
the process of doing so.10 8 In addition, a federal right to try law was
passed in May 2018, and signed into law by President Trump later that
year, which means that patients in states without the legislation can
obtain access to its benefits.11 There is insufficient space to consider the
precise history of right to try laws in the US,12 but it suffices to say
8.

See Federal Right To Try: Questions And Answers, GOLDWATER
INST., https://righttotry.org/rtt-faq/ [https://perma.cc/7T7W-35RB],
the website created and maintained by the Goldwater Institute, the
thinktank responsible for creating the initial ‘off the shelf’ legislation.

9.

It should, however, be noted that this is a false narrative.
See José Miola, Bye Bye Bolitho: The Curious Case of the Medical
Innovation Bill, 15 J. MED. L. INT. 124 (2015); see also R. Dresser, The
“Right to Try” Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access
Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631 (2015) (regarding the position in the US).

10.

GOLDWATER INST., supra note 7.

11.

See Lynch et al., supra note 5.

12.

For a history of the Right to Try movement in the United States, see Erin
Mershon, How the ‘right-to-try’ movement muscled its way into
Washington, STAT (Mar.
7,
2018), https://www.statnews.com/
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that the laws began life as ‘off the shelf’ legislation created by the right
wing, libertarian think-tank The Goldwater Institute (the Institute).13
The Institute refers to itself as aiming “to defend and strengthen the
freedom guaranteed to all Americans . . . [and] a national leader for
constitutionally limited government.”14 This focus on limiting the role
of government has led some to argue that the real purpose behind the
legislation is a desire to weaken the Food and Drug Administration’s
control over drug licensing, replacing it with a free market system.15
This is, however, denied by the Institute.16 In any event, right to try
laws are advertised as solving the problem of a lack of access to
experimental drugs by patients with terminal illness.17 They claim to
give hope where previous regulatory regimes actively deny it.18 This is
made clear on the right to try website:
Right to Try is needed because:
• Dying people don’t have access to promising treatments once
clinical trials are over, even if they have been successful
2018/03/07/right-to-try-movement-washington/
[https://perma.cc/N344-WU5T]. Also influential was support from the
Abigail Alliance, an organization set up to lobby in support of the cancer
sufferer receiving experimental but unlicensed drugs. For a more recent
consideration of the background to the law and the different imperatives,
see FOLKERS ET AL., Federal Right to Try: Where is it Going?, 49(2)
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 26 (2019).
13.

See Do Dying Patients Have a Right to Try Experimental Drugs?
Libertarians
Say
Yes, GOLDWATER
INST. (Aug.
21,
2014),
http://righttotry.org/do-dying-patients-have-a-right-to-try-experimental
-drugs-libertarians-say-yes/ [https://perma.cc/4H8X-QNAC].

14.

Jennifer Tiedemann, Patient with Aggressive Brain Cancer Treated under
Right
to
Try, GOLDWATER
INST.
(Jan.
9,
2019),
https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/patient-with-aggressive-braincancer-receives-treatment-under-right-to-try-law/
[https://perma.cc/FQC2-R4WE].

15.

See Rita Rubin, Experts Critical of America’s Right to Try Drugs
Laws, 386 LANCET 1325,
1325
(2015); Alison
Bateman-House,
L. Kimberley, B. Redman, N. Dubler & A. Caplan, Right to Try Laws:
Hope,
Hype and
Unintended Consequences, ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 796 (2015).

16.

Goldwater Institute Responds to FDA Statement on Right to
Try, GOLDWATER INST. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/
article/goldwater-institute-responds-to-fda-statement-on-right-to-try/
[https://perma.cc/YDP8-Q7WW].

17.

5 Reasons for Right to Try, GOLDWATER INST. (Sept. 28, 2017),
https://righttotry.org/5-reasons-for-right-to-try/
[https://perma.cc/L9CK-CCVH].

18.

MARK FLATTEN, Dead on Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves
Little Hope for Dying Patients, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival/ [https://perma.cc/7VA6-B2BM].
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• The FDA compassionate use process doesn’t help enough
people
• It takes too long for promising treatments to be approved
• You shouldn’t have to ask the government for permission to try
to save your own life19
The above bullet points illustrate both the allusions to a lack of
access as the problem that is to be fixed by the legislation, as well as
the assertion, consistent with the Institute’s ideology, that government
involvement is a hindrance rather than a help. It might be expected,
given both this and an assumption of nominative determinism in the
legislation title, that right to try laws would provide both a right to
patients to try experimental drugs and access to those drugs. Or, in
other words, right to try laws impose a duty on manufacturers and
regulators to allow their use. Unfortunately, neither is the case. Rather,
right to try laws merely provide a set of circumstances where access to
drugs that have passed phase I clinical trials might be provided. They
are that:
• Patients must be terminally ill and unable to get to a clinical
trial
• The patient’s physician recommends the drug
• The patient signs informed consent form
• The manufacturer chooses to provide the drug
• The patient pays for the drug if the manufacturer chooses to
charge for it.
And if a patient chooses to access these drugs then:
• The patient may not sue the doctor or drug manufacturer in
negligence in relation to the decision to provide the drug.20
The assertion of a right is most commonly unfettered, therefore the
concept of a ‘right to try’ appears at first blush to empower a patient,
in all circumstances, to access identified drugs or treatment. However,
it is evident from the above that, rather than enshrining an unfettered
right to try and therefore access promising treatment, there is much
that is conditional. The patient may only use the legislation if she is
terminally ill21rather than, for example, if she feels subjectively that her
condition is unbearable. The physician acts as a gatekeeper – contrary

19.

GOLDWATER INST., supra note 17.

20.

See Dresser, supra note 9; Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan
McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115176, S. 204, 115th Cong. (2018).

21.

See 21 C.F.R. 312.81.
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to the tenets of a truly free market as supposedly encouraged by the
Institute. Meanwhile, the manufacturer may choose whether to provide
the drug at all, and also whether to charge for it. Therefore, a patient
who is any one of not terminally ill, lacking the support of her doctor
or poor will not have a ‘right’ to try anything at all. Even if she is none
of those things, the ultimate arbiter is the drug manufacturer. There is
no imperative imposed on manufacturers to provide access to the drug
and if they choose to provide access, then they may charge as much for
that access as they wish.22 Also worthy of note is the fact that the
legislation, hailed as a champion of individual patient rights, serves to
remove a significant patient right of redress. If the drug is provided
with the requested treatment, the patient automatically relinquishes
the right to sue in negligence if they believe that it should not have
been prescribed to them. Therefore, not only does the law fail to
enshrine a right to access treatment, it actively diminishes other, wellestablished rights.
In England and Wales, there was an attempt (from 2014-2016) to
introduce what was badged as a British version of a right to try.23 Lord
Saatchi’s ultimately unsuccessful Medical Innovation Bill (MIB) had a
prominent social media profile, and its Twitter feed on several occasions
sought to ally itself with its US counterpart by including the hashtag
‘righttotry’ at the end of tweets.24 However, Lord Saatchi’s Bill was not
a mere copy of the Goldwater legislation, and had personal tragedy as
its genesis, 25 Lord Saatchi’s wife died of cancer, and he determined that
the key barrier to medical innovation (and thus a cure for cancer) was
a fear of litigation.26 The removal of this fear was thus the only aim of
the MIB.27 Nevertheless the MIB’s authors, like proponents of right to
try, sold their proposed legislation on the promise of increased access
22.

See FDA
FACT
SHEET, U.S.
FOOD
https://www.fda.gov/media/133864/download
[https://perma.cc/HMW2-XATR].

23.

See Medical
Innovation
Bill
[HL]
2014-2015, UK
PARLIAMENT, https://services.parliament.uk/bills/201415/medicalinnovation.html [https://perma.cc/3H7G-BXRW] (charting
the Bill’s progress and amendments).

24.

Miola, supra note 9, at 125; José Miola, Postscript to the Medical
Innovation Bill: Clearing Up Loose Ends, 11(1) L. INNOVATION &
TECH. 17, 26 (2019).

25.

Bernadette Richards, Medical innovation laws:
innovation, 40 AUS. HEALTH REV. 282, 283 (2016).

26.

Maurice Saatchi, Lord
Saatchi
Bill:
We must liberate doctors
to innovate, TELEGRAPH (Jan.
26,
2014,
8:27
PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/saatchi-bill/10598161/LordSaatchi-Bill-We-must-liberate-doctors-to-innovate.html
[https://perma.cc/74ZH-P8MP].

27.

Richards, supra note 25, at 285.
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to experimental drugs and treatments.28 Take, for example, these quotes
from the MIB’s ‘official media partner’,29 the Daily Telegraph (one of
England’s best selling broadsheet newspapers): “[the MIB is a] Bill
which would empower patients and doctors to try out new innovative
treatments”;30 “[a] new law to allow patients to try untested medicines
will protect them and nurture medical innovation”;31 “Doctors could be
allowed to experiment on dying patients with novel treatments under a
new Bill . . . which looks set to become law”.32 Some other media outlets
went even further, suggesting explicitly that access would be improved.
City AM, for example, described the MIB as “[a] Bill proposed by Lord
Saatchi to give dying cancer patients access to unlicensed drugs”.33
It may therefore surprise readers to know that the MIB would have
done nothing of the sort. It would not have been limited to terminally
ill patients – indeed, it would have applied to any and all conditions
excluding only those undertaken for a purely cosmetic purpose,34 and
at no point did it contain any attempt to increase access to drugs and
treatments.35 Rather, the MIB only ever contained two clauses: one
relating to a database of innovative treatments and another, which was
the focus of the Bill, was the exemption from the usual application of
the law of negligence that legally indemnified a doctor providing an
28.

Miola, supra note 9, at 140.

29.

This was revealed in a briefing note to the House of Lords. See MAURICE
SAATCHI, Medical Innovation Bill: Session 2014-15 Briefing Note 1,
10 (June
10,
2014), http://medicalinnovationbill.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/05/Medical-Innovation-Bill-Briefing-Note-10th-June2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4N-6HXD]. See Miola, supra note 9, at
125.

30.

Lord Saatchi Launches the Consultation on his Medical
Innovation
Bill – Live’, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Feb.
24,
2014),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/saatchi-bill/10657747/LordSaatchi-launches-the-consultation-on-his-medical-innovation-billlive.html [https://perma.cc/CVH6-VGEJ] (emphasis added).

31.

C. HOPE, Leading Doctors Join With Patients to Back Lord Saatchi’s
Medical Innovation Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH (June 26, 2014) (emphasis
added) [https://perma.cc/L5DM-LLHK].

32.

S. KNAPTON, Huge Response to Lord Saatchi’s Medical Innovation
Bill, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (June
1,
2014)
(emphasis
added)
[https://perma.cc/5P5X-SVC3].

33.

Guy Bentley, Government Support for Saatchi Bill Could Mean Dying
Patients are Given Untested Drugs by March, CITYAM (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.cityam.com/1413795751/government-support-saatchi-billcould- see-dying-patients-given-untested-drugs-march
[https://perma.cc/LWE6-XP22].

34.

Medical Innovation Bill 2015, HL Bill [162] cl. 1(7) (UK).

35.

A reading of the wording of the Bill demonstrates that there is simply no
clause that provides for this. See Medical Innovation Bill 2014, HC
Bill [162] (UK).
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innovative drug or procedure if she followed the process contained in
the Bill.36 It was therefore framed as a regulatory symbol of hope
through access to potentially life saving treatment but the focus was on
the protection of doctors from negligence actions. As with the right to
try laws, the practical application of the proposed law was in fact a
limitation of a well-established and clearly framed protection under the
guise of enhancing individual access to unproven treatment.
Right to try laws and the MIB seek to address the same apparent
problem37 but come from very different starting points. For Lord
Saatchi, the tragic death of his wife from cancer made him determined
to loosen what he saw as the shackles that fear of the law put on
doctors.38 Meanwhile, the Goldwater Institute’s starting point was a
view that limited government was to be encouraged, and that it is the
right of individuals rather than government to determine what
treatments they should be able to access.39 Moreover, the substance of
the two pieces of legislation are different, with right to try concentrating
on the qualifying conditions for access, and the MIB on the law of
negligence. Yet, despite this, they share two things in common: first,
both ask the patient to engage in a bargain that swaps (theoretical)
access to experimental drugs for the legal protection of appropriate
provision of treatment and oversight of the doctor’s duty of care to look
after the best interests of the patient. Second, both right to try and the
MIB seek to appoint apparent informed consent as the primary
mechanism for protecting patient safety – something that we will argue
is particularly problematic, not least given the discrepancy between
how both pieces of legislation were sold and what they actually provide.
It is to these two issues that we now turn.

II. The ‘Bargain’
It is curious that laws built on the rhetoric of ‘patient rights’ have,
as a foundational requirement, the relinquishment of a well-established
legal protection. Both right to try laws and the MIB seek to entice the
patient into a bargain: in return for access to the experimental
36.

See Miola, supra note 24, at 19 (discussing the inclusion of a database for
innovative treatments); Miola, supra note 9, at 128 (noting that the Bill
was designed to protect doctors’ “responsible innovation” from
negligence).

37.

See
Right
to
Try, U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-othertreatment-options/right-try#:~:text=The%20Right%20to%20Try%20
Act%20permits%2Fallows%20eligible%20patients%20to,life%2D
threatening%20disease%20or%20condition [https://perma.cc/WC9EY25N].

38.

See Saatchi, supra note 26.

39.

See, e.g., GOLDWATER INST., supra note 16.
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treatment, they must agree to forego the right to seek legal redress in
relation to the decision to provide the drug.40 The rationale behind this
bargain is not difficult to explain. For advocates of right to try, the
mantra of individual choice and personal responsibility makes such a
deal attractive – ‘you pays your money, you takes your choice’.41
Meanwhile, for Lord Saatchi the entire point of the MIB was the
removal of the fear of litigation from doctors in order to encourage them
to innovate. It is therefore inevitable that the ability of the patient to
seek civil redress for harm caused by inappropriate or careless treatment
would have to be compromised or removed entirely in certain
circumstances, as without the removal of the right to sue the fear of
litigation would persist. There is no ability to interrogate or challenge
the advice given by the treating doctor in the identification of the
unproven treatment or support of the patient in seeking that treatment.
This leaves open potentially unprofessional conduct, questions of
conflict of interest or simply careless treatment.
This bargain is, of course, presented as a part of a package that is,
ultimately, of benefit to the patient, consistent with the presentation of
both pieces of legislation as enhancing patients’ rights and ability to
access experimental drugs and treatments. The wall of protection
thrown up around the treatment team is underplayed, if not completely
ignored. The purported value to patients of this bargain is predicated
upon the promises of access to drugs and treatments that would
otherwise be unavailable. But these promises are not met by the Bills
themselves which, on the most generous interpretation, offer little more
than a right to ask for access to a drug or treatment, so long as certain
pre-requisites are met. This therefore falls short of an unfettered right
of access. Indeed the ‘rights’ based laws offer no new right, there is no
obligation imposed on drug manufacturers to provide the drug, on
doctors to make the patient aware of the drugs, or on insurance
companies to provide insurance for the use of these drugs. On that
basis, we are compelled to ask: are these are actually good or bad
bargains? Or, to put it another way, does the harm of foregoing the
benefit of post hoc protection balance out against the benefit of the
ability to seek access to drugs or treatments that are unproven, could
cause further harm and are uninsured. The benefits to the patient are
difficult to identify; not only is the access to the drugs only a potential
access, the benefit of the drugs themselves is, at best, a potential benefit,
sitting alongside potential harm. The patient is granted nothing more
40.

It should be noted that this does not extend to the administration of the
medication. If, for example, the wrong dosage was given or it was injected
in the wrong place then the patient would still be able to sue. See Bolam
v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1WLR 583 (U.K.).

41.

Taken from Aldous Huxley’s foreword to the 1946 edition of Brave New
World; see H. Bloom, BLOOM’S MODERN CRITICAL VIEWS: ALDOUS
HUXLEY 100 (Infobase Publishing, 2010).
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than a roll of the dice. Framed in this way, it looks to be a very poor
bargain indeed.
This assertion becomes clearer when we consider the specific
provisions, and practical application of the two regimes under
consideration here. Turning first to the right to try movement. It will
be remembered that it sells itself as an antidote to an FDA process that
is apparently onerous, slow, and does not help enough people.42 The
strong implication is that right to try would solve these problems.
However, comparing the FDA regime to right to try does not make it
evident how right to try would actually help. First, right to try promises
access to drugs that have passed phase I clinical trials,43 while the FDA
compassionate use program allows access to drugs before they have
passed Phase I – an earlier point in the process.44 Secondly, the
implication that the FDA is denying access to drugs is not supported
by the facts. As the FDA themselves report, their compassionate use
program has approved 99% of requests.45 The 2018 Program Report was
the result of an independent assessment with the “key goals” to “better
understand the expanded access program’s performance and identify
ways to improve it.”46
Whilst this serves as an acknowledgement that the program could
be improved, it also shows that what is not lacking is will on the part
of the FDA, and that it will continue to be receptive to reform of its
program rather than its marginalization. Significantly, the focus of the
FDA program is to “ensure patients continue to receive timely and
medically appropriate access to investigational medical products
through the EA program” and to balance the input of the wide variety
of stakeholders (including healthcare providers, patients, drug and
42.

See Lynch et al., supra note 5.

43.

See
Right
to
Try, U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-othertreatment-options/right-try#:~:text=The%20Right%20to%20Try%20
Act%20permits%2Fallows%20eligible%20patients%20to,life%2D
threatening%20disease%20or%20condition [https://perma.cc/G57Z7QFE].

44.

Dresser, supra note 9.

45.

Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb M.D. on New Efforts
to Strengthen FDA’s Expanded Access Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Nov.
8,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm625397.htm [https://perma.cc/QT
Y2-KAQJ]. See also Expanded Access Program Report 2018, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN. 1,
2
(May
2018), https://www.fda.gov/
media/119971/download (covering an independent assessment of the
scheme which reported that over a 5-year period approximately 9,000
applications were processed with an approval rate of 99%)
[https://perma.cc/3WA3-TAUA].

46.

Expanded Access Program Report 2018, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 1, 2
(May 2018).
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device manufacturers).47 The FDA is demonstrating a wider focus than
that of the crafters of the right to try laws who have created an unequal
bargain. An important participant in the right to try bargain is the
drug manufacturing industry, and whilst it is not something that the
authors of right to try can be blamed for as they will not have known
in advance, there is a significant gap in their proposed bargain. The
legislated bargain relies on the support of drug manufacturers; indeed,
a successful bargain relies on the manufacturers coming to the table,
but as yet, they have failed to do so. This was clearly explained by a
representative of Merck and Co in the following terms: “While well
intentioned, current ‘Right to Try’ legislation is not in the best interests
of patients and is unlikely to help us bring forward innovative, safe and
effective medicines to all patients as quickly as possible.”48
They are not alone, with some citing a fear that allowing their
products to be used in right to try requests may hinder attempts to
obtain full FDA funding.49 It is also of note that patient groups have
not supported the passage of the law. For example, Folkers et al.
reported that over eighty patient groups signed on to various letters to
members of Congress asking them to oppose right to try, whilst only
seventeen groups signed a letter addressed to the Senate on August 2,
2017, to encourage passage of a federal bill.50
The bargain offered by right to try cannot be said to be a good one,
and in some respects the law is best described as aspirational. It
empowers drug companies to make drugs available but there is no
mandate, and, as we have seen, the companies have expressed
reservations about the law.51 The most notable failing of the bargain is
that the benefit offered is illusory: the law does not seem to offer any
appreciable advantages over the FDA program and, crucially, it
removes a significant right of redress from patients, as the FDA
program does not entail the loss of the right to sue while right to try
legislation does. In other words, despite the rights-based rhetoric, using
right to try rather than the FDA program would give patients fewer
rights rather than more, for no appreciable increase in their chances of
access.
Lord Saatchi’s MIB would have fared equally badly. The driving
force behind the Bill – and the only factor identified as a barrier to
doctors innovating – was doctors’ apparent fear of the law of negligence.
47.

Id. at 3.

48.

Shannon Firth, Will “Right to Try” Bill Actually Help Anyone?, MED.
PG. TODAY (Aug.
11,
2017), https://www.medpagetoday.com/
publichealthpolicy/fdageneral/67222 [https://perma.cc/2H5Q-GJ35].

49.

Id.

50.

Folkers et al., Federal Right to Try: Where is it Going?, 49(2) HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 26, 30 (2019).

51.

Firth, supra note 48.
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The MIB’s bargain therefore swapped the patient’s right to sue in
negligence (hence removing the fear from doctors) for the promised
access to unidentified drugs and treatments, or at the very least a
change in culture that would encourage such access to be granted. Yet
the very premise that doctors were prevented from innovating due to a
fear of litigation was an assumption that was not supported by the
evidence.52 When the Department of Health issued its consultation on
the MIB, it asked whether it was the experience of respondees that
innovation was being stifled by a fear of litigation.53 The responses were
chastening for supporters of Lord Saatchi’s Bill, as only one small
organization responded that there was such a fear.54 Against this, all of
the key stakeholders responded that no such fear existed. As one of us
has previously noted:
In other words, neither the doctors’ trade union (the BMA), or
either of the medical defence bodies (MDU and MPS), who
doctors might be expected to consult first if worried about
litigation, found any evidence of a fear of litigation deterring
innovative treatment nor has the NHS body that would deal with
such claims if they were to arise (the NHSLA). As demonstrated
above, neither did the research bodies such as Cancer Research
UK and the Association of Medical Research Charities.55

Also coming out in opposition were the GMC,56 the medical
regulator in the UK,57 and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers.58
The MIB therefore managed to achieve something rare: it united
doctors (medical defense bodies), lawyers (both claimant - and defense
- focused), and research charities; but not in the way that its authors
would have hoped. Patients were being asked to waive their right to
sue in negligence in return for the promised removal of a fear that none
of the key stakeholders agreed was there in the first place. And the
52.

See Miola, supra note 9, at 131–32.

53.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REPORT
MEDICAL INNOVATION BILL (2014).

54.

The organization was BASO-ACS (British Association of
Surgical
Oncologists – Association for Cancer Surgery). See DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION ON THE MEDICAL INNOVATION
BILL 11 (2014).

55.

Miola, supra note 9, at 132.

56.

Id. at 136 (noting that the GMC referred to the Bill as “unnecessary and
undesirable”).

57.

See generally Medical Act 1983, c. 54 (UK).

58.

Medical Innovation Bill Threatens to ”Erode Patient Safety,”
APIL
(Apr.
25,
2014), https://www.apil.org.uk/press-release/MedicalInnovation-Bill-threatens-to-erode-patient-safety
[https://perma.cc/6PUJ-SU9E].
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identified benefit? Potential access to potential treatment that was
unproven and unsupported. A poor bargain indeed.
Let us be very clear about right to try laws and the MIB: they do
not succeed, even on their own terms, if their purpose is to provide
enhanced rights for patients. Neither provides access to any drugs or
devices that doctors could not otherwise use (the MIB makes no
mention of access, and right to try laws promise access at a point later
than the FDA expanded use program) Neither allows a medical
practitioner to do anything that she could not otherwise do. Finally,
and perhaps crucially, neither provides any funding – something that
was identified as a barrier to providing innovative treatments – that
was not there before.59 Moreover, they are specifically sold on a false
promise of increased access to drugs and treatments that they cannot
deliver.
For these reasons, the bargains that they invite patients to engage
in are to all intents and purposes bogus. They are based on illusory
benefits that come at an unacceptable cost. In the case of right to try,
patients are asked to forego their right to sue in return for a program
that is less advantageous than the existing one. The access to drugs is
later than the FDA program would allow, has a less protective system
of oversight and would struggle to meet the 99% approval rate of the
existing program.60 Equally, the MIB asks patients to swap their right
to sue in return for the removal of a fear of litigation that there is little
indication exists (and, where it does, could be mitigated by better
education for doctors rather than a removal of the rights of patients).
Patients, who are told that these laws would add to their rights, would
actually see them eroded for no good reason.
But there is one way in which this approach does make sense. If we
recategorize patients as “consumers exercising choices,”61 and tell them
that “adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment
is uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility
for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with the
consequences of their choices,”62 we can ask them to trade the control
for responsibility. The natural quid pro quo to making one’s own
decisions is that the decision-maker has both ownership of the decision
and responsibility for its consequences. Readers with a background in
English medical law will recognize the above quotes as coming from the
landmark UK Supreme Court case of Montgomery. v Lanarkshire
59.

See Miola, supra note 9, at 128.

60.

See Expanded Access (Compassionate Use) Submission Data, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/expanded-access/
expanded-access-compassionate-use-submission-data
[https://perma.cc/L8XN-65WY].

61.

Montgomery UKSC 11, at [75] (quoting Lord Kerr and Lord Reed).

62.

Id. at [81] (emphasis added).
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Health Board.63 This was a case about informed consent, and it is no
surprise that another aspect of what right to try and the MIB seek to
do is to replace negligence with informed consent as the mechanism for
patient protection. The latter is far more in keeping with a view of
patients as making and owning their own decisions in a market –
certainly consistent with the Goldwater Institute’s view of the world;
and equally so with Lord Saatchi’s vision of patients making their own
choices and allowing innovating doctors the freedom to thrive without
fear of legal censure.
All of this, of course, begs the question of whether informed consent
is up to the task that it is has been set by these laws. We consider this
later in this paper, but before that we focus on some other problems
inherent in their approach.

III. So What’s the Problem
The introduction of new drugs and devices into standard care
occurs within a carefully constructed, protective framework.64 This is
usually through clinical trials, where there is a framework that balances
a breadth of interests and has as its foundational principle protection
of the vulnerable patient and support for responsible clinical
innovation.65 This requires a high level of regulation but the regulation
is not, as some would assert, driven by market forces.66 Rather it has
as its primary purpose protection of both the public health system and
individual patient health care and both of these, of necessity, involves
control over access to drugs and treatment until they are deemed safe.67
This crucial characteristic of the regulatory scheme was highlighted in
the US in the Abigail Alliance decision, when the Court drew attention
to the fact that the rights based arguments overlook the significant
63.

Id.

64.

This is overseen by the FDA in the US and the Medicines and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Industry (MHRA) in the UK and the Therapeutic
Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia. See SHWETA HANDOO ET
AL., A comprehensive study on regulatory requirements for development
and filing of generic drugs globally, INT. J. PHARM. INVESTIG. 2(3):99-105
(2012).

65.

In the UK, there is a new regularly framework starting in 2021, replacing
the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations
2004. Bukky Balogun, Elizabeth Rough & Sarah Barber, Research
Briefing: Medicines and Medical Devices Bill 2019-21, HOUSE OF
COMMONS
LIBRARY (Jan.
27,
2021),
https://commonslibrary.
parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8699/ [https://perma.cc/WCW9X6MN].

66.

See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v.
Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

67.

See generally HAZEL BIGGS, HEALTHCARE RESEARCH ETHICS
15 (Abingdon, Cavendish, 2010).
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‘history of regulating the safety of drugs’ and suggested that the focus
on accessibility and effectiveness of particular forms of treatment
‘ignores one simple fact: it is unlawful for the Alliance to procure
experimental drugs not only because they have not been proven
effective, but because they have not been proven safe’.68
As a background note, the Abigail Alliance, like the MIB, grew out
of personal tragedy, Abigail Burroughs suffered from neck cancer and
was ineligible to enter a clinical trial, the Alliance was formed and her
case brought to court. The Alliance challenged the established clinical
trial framework and argued for more expanded access on the basis that
the existing process was “inadequate to meet the needs of its terminally
ill patients.”69 The Alliance also argued that they had a constitutional
right of autonomy and self-defense where the Alliance asserted inter
alia that the control exercised by the FDA and other regulators was
driven by market imperatives and was not about protection of patients.
The court ultimately rejected this argument. The introduction of the
right to try laws and the MIB echoes the arguments raised by the
Abigail Alliance (and ultimately rejected by the court), and represents
a significant shift in the nature of the dialogue with the focus on an
assertion of individual rights as opposed to collective interests. It cannot
be denied that the motivation behind this regulatory initiative is
positive, since it is about supporting individuals suffering from terrible
diseases who feel disempowered by their poor health. But asserting a
right to try unproven drugs and overriding the protective framework
without careful review of either efficacy or safety, (as is provided by the
expanded access program), is exposing those patients to unnecessary
risk of further harm.70 The rights-based dialogue has gained traction
because of a natural sympathy for those who are unwell, and a
perception that everything can be cured.71 This is a poor foundation for
major legal review as it represents a misconception, as a right to try
experimental drugs or treatments will not automatically lead to good
health. Unfortunately, the belief in the efficacy of these drugs is, at
best, overly optimistic and at worst, dangerously naïve.72
The narrative behind the introduction of these laws appeals to
public sympathy and employs emotive language. When Lord Saatchi
introduced the MIB he did not engage with clinical benefits or broader
public health interests. Rather, he relied on dark tales of cancer sufferers
68.

Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703.

69.

Id. at 699.

70.

This was the crux of the opposition to Lord Saatchi’s Medical Innovation
Bill in the UK. In a letter of opposition, the Academy of Medical Royal
Colleges warned that people could “risk untested treatments.” Miola,
supra note 24, at 24.

71.

Dresser, supra note 9.

72.

Id.
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living through scenes “that would not be permitted in a Hollywood
horror movie”73 and the description of those “condemned [to death] by
cancer” as suffering “a worse fate than the worst mass murderer[s],
[w]hile they await execution, they are tortured.”74 And the Right to Try
laws are built on stories of tragedy and ‘avoidable’ death. The right to
try website has headline photos of children and teenagers who have had
to leave the country to gain access to potentially life saving treatment
or are fighting to save their own lives with the assistance of right to try
laws.75 Under the heading ‘Why we Needed Right to Try’ is the
publication ‘Dead on Arrival’ which, amongst other things, tells the
incredibly sad tale of Nick Auden, a 41-year-old who died in 2013 after
trying unsuccessfully to enroll in clinical trials and access drugs under
the expanded access scheme.76 His story is undeniably a tragic one, but
the center piece of the narrative is the refusal by Merck and BristolMyers Squibb to support his expanded access application, the
implication being that right to try laws would have enabled access and
potentially saved his life.77 However, this is misleading because, as we
have seen in the preceding discussion, the law does not impose a duty
on companies to provide access to their drugs, and Merck
representatives have not been supportive of the laws and argue that
they fail to protect the best interests of the patients.78 Given this, it is
wrong to assert that right to try would have helped that patient.
The starting point of the introduction of right to try laws can
therefore be seen as well-intentioned but misguided. There are two
other potential problems with these laws which are worth considering.
The first is that they fail in their primary goal, which is to protect the
patient, and the second is the potential negative effect on the ongoing
development of promising drugs -through the slowing down of clinical
trials and negative market impacts on companies developing a drug.
Each of these additional concerns will be addressed in turn.

IV. Fails in Primary Goal: Protection of the Patient
(The (In)Adequacy of Informed Consent)
As mentioned above, the right to try narrative rests firmly on
patient rights and an apparent protection of their interests, but it does
73.

742 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2013) col. 757 (UK).

74.

754 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2014) col. 1450 (UK).

75.

See righttotry,
GOLDWATER
[https://perma.cc/XGF6-GWEY].
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Dead On Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves Little Hope for
Dying Patients, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 24, 2016), http://righttotry.org/
dead-on-arrival/ [https://perma.cc/VL44-A6CG].
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this through a removal of the foundational right to bring an action in
negligence.79 The authors of the law might argue that this does not
reduce the overall protection of patients as it replaces this right, which
otherwise undermines the doctor-patient relationship, with other
protections.80 A common feature of right to try laws and the MIB is
this replacement of negligence (reviewing the doctor’s decision) with
informed consent (executing the patient’s wishes) as the primary
mechanism for protecting patient safety. However, changing the focus
in this way fails to appropriately protect the patient as it overlooks the
unequal nature of the doctor-patient relationship, the vulnerability of
the patient, and the potential for interests other than those of the
patient to insert themselves into the decision taken by the patient and
doctor to proceed with the provision of innovative treatment. In short,
whilst informed consent is an important patient right, it cannot
adequately protect the patient in these highly complex situations.
Before we consider this in more depth, it is worth restating that current
English law on informed consent, as determined by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Montgomery, is very much consistent with the ‘patient
choice’ ethos inherent in right to try and the MIB.81 As we note above,
the Supreme Court spoke of patients as “consumers exercising
choices.”82 It is also worth quoting more fully the other declaration of
intent that we noted above as it gives a flavor of the philosophy of the
law as seen by the judges:
[S]ocial and legal developments . . . point away from a model of
the relationship between the doctor and the patient based upon
medical paternalism. They also point away from a model based
upon a view of the patient as being entirely dependent on
information provided by the doctor. What they point towards is
an approach to the law which, instead of treating patients as
placing themselves in the hands of their doctors (and then being
prone to sue their doctors in the event of a disappointing
outcome), treats them so far as possible as adults who are capable
of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of success
and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of

79.

See Lynch et al., supra note 5.

80.

Indeed, Lord Saatchi has argued that the MIB would both protect
patients and encourage innovation. Doctors need more freedom to
innovate, say Peers, Democracy Live, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/house-of-commons-28055648
[https://perma.cc/WK78-62GD].
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risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of
their choices.83

Of course, this only functions properly if the law is able to protect
patients to make such choices meaningful and based on the information
that they need. In this section, we argue that informed consent is not
able to achieve this itself, and that it leaves patients exposed to ‘bad
actors.’84 Indeed, when we say that we want to encourage innovation,
what we really mean is that we want to encourage responsible
innovation while simultaneously discouraging irresponsible innovation.
It is worth noting here that the language we are using is the same as
the original MIB with s1(1) providing that ‘The purpose of this Act is
to encourage responsible innovation,’ the key point of differentiation
being that we do not agree with the underlying premise of how this is
to be achieved. We agree that the critical distinction between
responsible and irresponsible innovation should be supported by the law
and requires a level of regulatory oversight, but informed consent is not
a sufficiently sharp tool for making this distinction. This is for several
reasons.
To begin with, it is almost trite to say that informed consent
depends on information.85 The doctor must provide the patient with
sufficient relevant information for her to make an autonomous
decision.86 But this means that the patient’s decision will depend at
least in part on what information is given, and how it is presented. A
doctor who is an enthusiastic adopter or supporter of a specific
innovation can easily become, intentionally or unintentionally, an
advocate for it.87 When asked by the patient whether they would take
the offered treatment the doctor will often provide answers in the
affirmative, and this, along with their general support for the treatment,
will go some way to persuading or reassuring the patient that the
treatment is worthwhile.88 While this can, in theory, be addressed by
the law, there is little in the cases that relates to tone, and Montgomery
83.

Id. at [81] (emphasis added).

84.
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itself is noticeably vague on the issue of the mechanics of
communication.89 Yet this might well be absolutely crucial, as there are
two other factors in relation to these patients that makes them more
than usually vulnerable to such persuasion.
The first is that these are patients whose very position will mean
that they may well need little persuading.90 To qualify for right to try,
patients must be terminally ill, while the MIB was (erroneously)
advertised as relating most specifically for patients with rare cancers.91
Put bluntly, the idea is that these are patients for whom there is no
other hope: the standard treatment will be or have been ineffective, and
the experimental treatment is therefore the only hope that they have
left.92 They are likely to be extremely receptive to any suggestion that
offers the chance of a cure, alleviation of symptoms or at least a slowing
down of the progress of their disease.93 They will not hear the absence
of proof, rather they will focus solely on the unsubstantiated promise of
hope.
This is exacerbated by the second factor: the way in which the
debate surrounding right to try laws are framed so that the discourse
emphasizes good outcomes while minimizing the risk of adverse
outcomes.94 Rebecca Dresser has examined this in the context of right
to try in the US, and found this to be the case.95 As she notes, sometimes
data surrounding success rates can become drowned out by anecdotes
and distressing stories:
In defense of access oversight, scientists, FDA officials, and policy
experts cite data on investigational-drug risks and low success
rates, as well as the need for a rigorous drug-evaluation system.
But in the access debate, data and abstract policy considerations
go only so far. Access advocates use a different strategy, one that
highlights individual patients’ stories. To support their cause,
access advocates offer heartrending accounts of terminally ill
patients seeking investigational drugs and deceased patients who

89.

Heywood & Miola, supra note 6.

90.

Dresser, supra note 9.

91.

Miola, supra note 24, at 24.

92.

As noted above, the narrative constructed by both Right to Try and the
MIB is based on such cases.

93.

See D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A
Proposal for Heightened Safeguards, 15(2) J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 479, 503 (1999).

94. It should be noted that the latter are statistically more likely, particularly
at the phase I trial stage of development. See Dresser, supra note 9, at
1631.
95.

Id. at 1632.

125

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
Would we be Right to Try “Right to Try”?
were denied such drugs. These stories strongly influence
legislative and public opinion on the access question.96

Dresser goes on to demonstrate how advocates of right to try laws
used such stories to emphasize the ‘need’ for the legislation.97 In the
UK, supporters of the MIB did the same.98 However, Dresser also
demonstrates that both doctors and non-doctors can be incredibly
optimistic about how likely experimental drugs are to work, and that
the voices of those who have had adverse reactions to experimental
drugs are “drowned out.”99 In other words, the discourse surrounding
the provision of experimental drugs distorts rather than clarifies the
true situation. Patients are encouraged by advocates of such laws to
overestimate the chances of success, and the voices of those whose
quality of life has been made worse, or who have died horrendous deaths
or had their lives shortened rather than lengthened are marginalized or
silenced in our clamor to believe in the positive.100 Patients are
encouraged to believe that a drug in a phase I clinical trial is tomorrow’s
treatment today, rather than the reality, which is that it is far more
likely not to be found safe and/or effective than it is to ever be
licensed.101 This leads directly to the next identified concern which is
the negative impact that premature access to unproven treatments can
have on well-established development regimes.

V. Undermining Medical Advancement
The current process of bringing drugs into the clinical setting is a
carefully constructed clinical trial regime and involves staged and
closely monitored testing of the unproven drug.102 It is not a speedy
96.

Id.

97.

Id. at 1632–33.
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See, e.g., Laura Milne, Mum pleads for law to be changed to save her
son, EXPRESS (June
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100. Id. at 1654–55.
101. Id. at 1634–35 (she cites figures that put the figure at only 1 in 6 drugs).
102. For an example from Australia, see Australian clinical trial
handbook¸ AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH: THERAPEUTIC GOODS
ADMIN. 42 (Nov. 2020), https://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/aust
ralian-clinical-trial-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PD5-T8EQ]. For
an overview of the system in the USA, as coordinated by the FDA, see
Step
3:
Clinical
Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinicalresearch [https://perma.cc/P7C2-S76U]. At the time of writing the UK is
still subject to the EU’s Clinical Trials Regulations, governed by the
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency. See Clinical trials
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process but is designed to minimize risk with a focus on balancing the
interests of participants in the trial, those who are currently suffering
from the targeted illness, those who will suffer from it in the future and
broad public health considerations.103 It is a complex equation that
simply cannot please everyone or meet all identified needs but it is best
characterized as an appropriately protective regime.104 Clinical trials
often have restricted enrolment requirements and do not guarantee
access to trial drugs with the design often involving a placebo arm.105
Therefore, if an apparently promising form of treatment is made
available outside of the clinical trial framework it will be a preferable
path for those who focus on the hope provided by access to the new
regime (as opposed to the exposure to risk) and they will opt for this
path as opposed to the clinical trial one.
An example of how this can harm both patients and the clinical
trial process overall can be found in the cautionary tale of access to
aHSCT-HDIT (autologous hematopoietic stem cell transplant)
treatment for breast cancer in the 1980s and 90s in the United States.
The facts here are fairly straightforward (and are drawn from the
detailed account provided by Rettig et al, 2007.)106 The treatment
emerged in the late 1980s and was ‘catapulted’ into widespread use
before careful evaluation. Insurers characterized the treatment as
experimental and declined to provide coverage, in response to this a
number of enterprising patients and physicians then took the insurers

in
human
medicines, EUROPEAN
MEDICINES
AGENCY,
https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory/research-development
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have not been proven safe).
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44. For an overview of the system in the USA, as coordinated by the
FDA, see Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
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EVALUATION
OF
MEDICINAL
PRODUCTS
(June
28,
2001),
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106. See RICHARD A. RETTIG ET AL., FALSE HOPE: BONE MARROW
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to court arguing that the treatment was not experimental and sought
a court order that the appropriate cover be provided.107
Rettig et al reported that there were 75 unique reported cases and
one clear factor prevails; sympathy for these critically ill patients. A
review of some of the legal decisions reveals that it was often this
sympathy that swayed the decision- making and there was an urge to
save patients.108 It then became a self- perpetuating situation with the
courts being persuaded by the apparent widespread adoption of the
treatment being used as evidence of its acceptance and efficacy.109 It
took on the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy, but there was a
complete absence of scientific evidence and support. The prophecy was
false. But the widespread patient advocacy combined with the dire
health of the applicants swayed the courts, despite scientific and
medical challenges to the efficacy of the treatment.110 During this time
the relevant clinical trials were suffering with patients declining to
enroll in the trial because the treatment was otherwise widely
available.111 Ultimately the trials were completed and they universally
demonstrated that the treatment did not result in an increased chance
of survival.112 The only trial that had demonstrated a benefit was
subsequently audited and found to be fraudulent.113
An in-depth examination of this story is well beyond the scope of
this paper (and is provided elsewhere114), however it is worth noting as
it presents a cautionary tale of widespread access without full and
thorough research. Vulnerable patients bought into what proved to be
false hope and energies that could have been directed in a more
beneficial manner were focused on flawed treatment. Moreover, given
the perception that the treatment offered hope, many patients were
drawn to it and declined to participate in the established trial which
meant that the trial process was slowed, those patients were all acting
on perception of hope as opposed to evidence based treatment and
positive harm was suffered by some vulnerable patients.115
A further cautionary tale can be found in premature access to an
undeveloped drug in response to a potential global pandemic. An

107. Id. at 3, 11-14.
108. Id. at 82, 101-02.
109. Id. at 108.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 216-17.
112. Id. at 241.
113. Id. at 243-45.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 286.
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example was provided by Dresser116 and Bateman- House117 in
consideration of the response to the Ebola crisis. Both explained that
the negative publicity surrounding early access to a developing
treatment could cause a drug company to cease development and
withdraw it from the trial process, thus limiting future development.118
The drug discussed by Bateman-House was the experimental drug
Brincidofovir which was administered to Thomas Duncan who was
suffering from Ebola.119 Unfortunately, either the drug did not work or
he was too far progressed with his illness but he died and there was
significant backlash against the company, and a subsequent drop in the
stock price.120 The company withstood the financial threat but
Bateman- House raised the question of what would have happened if
the negative impact had caused the company to fail.121 A promising
drug would have ceased its development and the potential for broader
benefit lost.
A more generalized argument about the wider implications of right
to try laws was made during the debate surrounding the MIB in the
UK by medical research charities. This is that, where there are rare
diseases, patients opting for treatment under the ‘innovative treatment’
pathway instead of joining a trial may make such trials unviable due
to a lack of participants.122 It should be noted at this point that this
criticism applies specifically to the MIB, as qualification for the US
Right to Try laws is dependent on it not being possible to join a clinical
trial.123 There was no such protection of trial viability in the MIB. This
is perhaps surprising, as the Goldwater Institute’s philosophy of the
focus on the individual and freedom from state interference might be
thought to preclude a duty to help the collective rather than oneself –
which is ultimately what a clinical trial does. In other words, we should
be clear that, at least in the British version of the law, there would be
potential negative effects on the ability of researchers to recruit
sufficient participants for clinical trials to be run in relation to rare
116. DRESSER, supra note 9, at 1632.
117. Alison Bateman-House, Drug Development, Compassionate Use, and
Adverse
Events:
A
Cautionary
Tale, BIOETHICS.NET,
http://www.bioethics.net/2015/03/drug-development-compassionateuse-and-adverse-events-a-cautionary-tale/[https://perma.cc/WR65BS8E].
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Miola, supra note 24, at 24.
123. See Right to Try, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-other-treatment-options
[https://perma.cc/B96V-59GR].
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diseases. Tragically, the more rare the disease the more likely it is that
this might come to pass and the lack of sufferers will already make it
difficult to recruit for a trial, which ironically pushes patients towards
‘innovative treatment’ rather than a trial.
But we should also be clear about the corollary of this, as argued
above. What we and the research charities are implicitly acknowledging
is that we support encouraging patients to participate in trials rather
than receive the more direct benefit of innovative treatment as a patient
rather than a research participant. We should also be honest and admit
that this would ask the patient to do something that is potentially not
in their interests. This is for two reasons. First, in the trial the
participant may be placed in the control group, if there is one. Second,
the purpose of treatment as a patient is to directly benefit the patient.
In a clinical trial, the purpose is instead to gather information.124 A
benefit to the participants may accrue, but it is not the primary aim,
which is to gather data – although of course the clinical trials framework
requires that patients are not harmed, and if their condition deteriorates
they will be removed from the trial and treated.125 Moreover, researchers
are of course actively looking and hoping for improvement in the
patient’s condition.126 That is not to say that innovative treatments will
necessarily be better, and the reality is that outcomes will not always
be positive– as Keren-Paz notes, there is often a lag between innovative
treatments being tried to their being perfected, so one should prefer not
to be among the first patients to receive them.127 Nevertheless, at least
the aim and intention would be to treat the patient, which is not the
case in a clinical trial. This may be little more than a symbolic
difference in almost all cases, since as mentioned above the hope with
124. For an example of human research guidelines from Australia,
see NAT’L HEALTH & MED. RES. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STATEMENT ON
ETHICAL CONDUCT IN HUMAN RESEARCH, https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/
about-us/publications/national-statement-ethical-conduct-humanresearch-2007-updated-2018 (last
updated
2018). For
the
UK
equivalent, see Research
Ethics
Service
&
Research
Ethics
Committees, NAT’L HEALTH
SVC.
HEALTH
RES.
AUTH.,
https://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-us/committees-and-services/res-andrecs/ [https://perma.cc/DXD3-8QYH].
125. See Good
practice
in
research
and
Consent
to
research, GEN. MED. COUNCIL (2020),
https://www.gmc-uk.org//media/documents/Good_practice_in_research_and_consent_to_rese
arch.pdf_58834843.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9BP-NWFW].
126. See generally id. (noting that research is important for improving health,
but that researchers must prioritize the safety and wellbeing of
participants over research outcomes).
127. T. KEREN-PAZ, No Fault (Strict) Liability for Injuries from Innovative
Treatments: Fairness or Also Efficiency?, 11(1) L., Innovation &
Tech. 55 (2019).
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a trial is that the participant’s condition will improve, but with
innovative treatment the focus is solely on the patient, and there is no
trial framework or wider aim to cause tensions.

Conclusion
We have argued that the right to try narrative (both in relation to
the US’s right to try laws and the MIB in the UK), fail to stand up to
scrutiny. The claims made regarding access do not match the reality,
and the bargain that patients are asked to engage in is deeply flawed.
Patients are asked to forgo a well-established right to seek legal redress
in the form of negligence, but gain little more than potential in return.
This does not mean that we perceive negligence law to be faultless, but
what we do demand is that any system that is proposed for replacing
it should be shown to be better, and in neither right to try legislation
nor the MIB can this been said to be the case. We have also identified
that the notion of shifting the law’s patient protection mechanism from
negligence to informed consent is ineffective and can only result in a
watering down of the law’s ability to respond adequately to
irresponsible innovation. If the crux of the law should be the
encouragement of responsible innovation combined with the
discouragement of irresponsible innovation, then these laws can be seen
to fail on both counts.
Indeed, a further, unintended consequence of the removal of the
ability of injured patients to sue in negligence is that the law’s role as
a deterrent to bad actors is compromised. Medical practitioners who
are either ‘snake oil salesmen’ or, perhaps even more concerningly, too
inexperienced or insufficiently skilled to see the flaws in their thinking
also gain immunity from being sued.
We have also demonstrated that such laws contain other dangers,
from the threat to the viability of clinical trials in rare diseases, to the
aHSCT-HDIT example, where an ineffective treatment became widely
available. Patients do not gain anything from such treatments, and lose
the opportunity to try something else that might work. We are all
agreed that there must be some method of allowing accelerated access
to innovative drugs and treatments for patients who have no other
hope, indeed regulatory bodies actively encourage and support such
access. However, right to try laws are clearly not the best way and serve
to undermine existing pathways. We suspect that the real answer may
be more mundane: there is little evidence that either the FDA scheme
in the US or the accelerated access schemes in the UK suffer from a
lack of desire to make drugs available. It may well be that with better
funding more patients can be helped. Yet whether or not that is the
case, the removal of the right to sue in negligence in return for no
greater access than afforded by these schemes (as is the reality of right
to try laws and the MIB, rather than the narrative) not only takes us
no further forward, but is likely to make matters worse. A final
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cautionary note to sound is that the naming of these schemes is actively
misleading. Neither of the regulatory frameworks presents a meaningful
right to try anything. They both stop well short of empowering
patients, and the ‘bargains’ that they seek to strike with patients can
only be described as bad.
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